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This paper makes two related contributions. First, the dual economic structure underlying development is shown as
producing a distinct conception of other comprising of a devalued third world which is foregrounded and world of the
third which is excluded. This dyad of inclusion-exclusion of other is produced in relation to the centers of capitalism and
modernism. The category of third world helps to displace the language-experience-logic-ethos of the other a la world of
the third such that development works over and transforms world of the third, but via the trope of a devalued third
world. We then use this framework to explore the relation of global capitalism with world of the third in the Indian con-
text, a relation that is shown to be two fold. There is on one hand an attempt to dismantle world of the third as part of the
development trope of overcoming the third world. On the other, through inclusive development, an attempt is made to di-
rectly intervene in the economy of world of the third so as to address the problems of income inequality and social exclu-
sion, again under the trope of uplifting the devalued third world.
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Introduction
The larger context of this paper is the current Indian
economic cartograph, marked by the mutually constitu-
tive triad of neoliberal globalization, global capitalism
and inclusive development, producing what many have
now dubbed the case of Indian miracle story. The focus of
the paper is on one of the arms of the triad, 'inclusive de-
velopment' and its role in the transition of the Indian
economy. Three issues are highlighted in the process.
The first will bring to light the point that inclusive devel-
opment (in tandem with the two other nodes) is a compo-
nent of the modernization exercise that aspires to pose
the category of tradition (represented in our paper
through the category 'third world') so as to enact a trans-
formation of that space. The second concerns the fact
that the so–called Indian miracle has generated new
kinds of schisms, essentially related to income and social
divides, which is a pre–requisite for the project of inclu-
sive development. Finally, we intend to show how inclu-
sive development forces a re–conceptualization of the In-
dian state whereby it resets its rationale through a
combination of neoliberal and dirigiste roles. Our repre-
sentation, however, requires a critical evaluation of the
dual structure – modern and tradition, capitalist and
pre-capitalist, industry and agriculture, formal and in-
formal – that forms the theoretical framework of devel-
opment; where modern capitalism epitomizing an indus-
trial society becomes one arm and tradition or pre-capita-
lism symbolizing an agrarian society another; the latter
gives form to the imagery and trope of the third world. A
critical evaluation of third world by way of interrogating
this dual structure in turn demands a new framework;
this paves the way for a new counter-concept: »world of
the third«. For details see Chakrabarti, Dhar and Cullen-
berg (2012)1. As shall be explored, a counter-frame that
works with the dyad 'third world-world of the third' en-
ables us to explore, in a critical vein, the operation of in-
clusive development in relation to the three issues high-
lighted here.
While India is often bracketed with BRICS countries
and its transition compared with them, particularly
China, it must be recognized that the Indian economy
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functioning within a specific social formation has its own
peculiarity which in turn makes the trajectory of its tran-
sition path-dependent. Because of this, even if other
countries such as China share the influence of neoliberal
globalization and global capitalism, the trajectory of In-
dia’s transition process is irreducible to any one of them.
To get a sense of the path-dependent trajectory of the In-
dian economy which will also help set up the context of
the paper, let us briefly revisit its post-independent eco-
nomic history.
Given a mixed economy, the post-independence path
fixed by the Indian policy makers was that of centralized
allocation of resources which led to state directed control
of market economy. First growth (2nd five year plan) and
then growth with redistribution (5th five year plan) be-
came the mantra of India’s state-sponsored development
objective for the period 1950–1990. Finally, the era of lib-
eralization policies began with the decontrol of market
economy in the early 1990s, which subsequently was
deepened in the next two decades. These policies led to
the setting up of a competitive market economy, with the
role of state gradually truncated; this meant an de-em-
phasis on state directed allocation of resources. In the
post-liberalization period, the initial emphasis was back
on growth with the second objective of redistribution rel-
atively demoted; this was roughly the period from 1991–
2004. As the benefits of economic growth were soon
found to be accompanied by exclusions, rising income in-
equalities and equally obstinate social inequities, the at-
tention reverted back to the question of income gap and
poverty once again, and in that context, a reassessment
of the transition route of the Indian economy was seen as
essential. This inaugurated the framing of the concept of
inclusive development.
Given this background, let us first analyze the impor-
tance of world of the third in the context of third world,
and explain why this dyad is fundamental to understand-
ing modernization process as such. This discussion then
will set up the theoretical points of reference and depar-
ture for our foray into the interstices of inclusive devel-
opment in India.
Tradition, Third World and World of the
Third: Development as the Secret Politics
of Modernization
The category of 'tradition' appears in conjunction with
that of 'modern' through a set of contrasting and compa-
rable images that helps differentiate and hence define
the two in opposition2; the production of the two catego-
ries are such that 'tradition' emerges as a devalued other
of the 'modern'3. While tradition takes different imager-
ies depending upon the context of knowledge, in case of
development it is telescoped by the category third world
(further re-presented as community, social capital, etc.)
as representative of a helpless, deformed, pathological
existence of space-people in the South and symbolizing
'underdevelopment'; terms such as 'less developed', 'de-
veloping' and 'developed' came in vogue to represent the
lacking state of this rather devalued existence.
In this context, some striking similarities character-
ize the conventional development models. The first is the
representation of underdevelopment as dualistic in which
one arm is rendered devalued in terms of a chosen privi-
leged center; the structure then is that of a 'center’ (mod-
ern/capitalist) and its 'lacking other’ (traditional/pre-cap-
italist); where the lacking other is the third world; the
devalued existence of third world finds its most potent
representation in mass poverty that is supposed to ema-
nate from its backward and reactionary social institu-
tions. The second is that development works over the de-
valued other in the form of some 'pull up’ strategy; this
pull up strategy may be top down (explicitly managerial)
or bottom up (with people having some voice), but they
invariably pertain to uplifting the third world, including
from mass poverty. Third, developmental philosophy is
teleological whereby the dual model moves from a preor-
dained origin to a predestined end (tradition to modern,
pre-capitalist to capitalist, agrarian to industrial, infor-
mal to formal); development thus captures the utopia of
a larger civilizational transformation from a 'traditional’
pre-capitalist agriculture dominated economy – the state
of 'less development – to a 'modern’ capitalist industry
dominated economy – the state of 'developed’. From
Rodenstein-Rodan to Nurkse to Lewis to Rostow to So-
low, all classical models of development exhibit this de-
terministic and teleological characteristic which presu-
mes a rationalized end for all social formations, where
the end is deemed as the summit; incidentally they are
all dealing with problems pertaining to the moderniza-
tion process and transition through socio-economic engi-
neering. Much of the current discourses in mainstream
development take these models as the point of reference,
albeit displacing them in innovative directions. Notwith-
standing their other differences, these dual models are
founded on two privileged centers: capitalism and moder-
nity; the logic of transition is driven by these centers
such that the other is attempted to be worked upon and
transformed in their images. A gift of colonialism, this
modernization process has marked the transition process
of India, from its colonial history to a state sponsored de-
velopment paradigm (1950–1990) to the post-liberaliza-
tion competitive market driven paradigm. This is the ele-
ment of historical continuity in India’s transitional
journey.
What is critical here is to appreciate the discursive
power of the category of tradition qua third world; also,
urban bias is inherent in the very epistemology of how a
Southern society such as India comes to be represented.
The issue here is not what we discuss, but how we set up
what we discuss. In other words, what we are claiming
here is the existence of a pre-given, embedded, political
authority of modernism-capitalism that subsequently is
encapsulated in any description, explanation, outcomes
and policies. In short, the dual models – the framework
in which the category of development appears and func-
tions – are embedded in the hegemony of modernism
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-capitalism. Policies, including those pertaining to inclu-
sive development, must be read in the context of this he-
gemonic formation in which the process of moderniza-
tion-capitalization is naturalized. However, if we want to
present the politics of (inclusive) development, then it is
imperative that we explain the following question: hege-
mony of modernism-capitalism over whom? Now the
problem is that it can’t be over 'third world’ for third
world is produced from the perspective of the modern-
ism-capitalism. One cannot but have a denigrated repre-
sentation of third world, with negative characteristics
protracted in relation to what is already there in modern-
ism-capitalism. In other words, the framework of the
dual structure lacks an independent theorization of the
space of the Other; this space of the Other is paradoxi-
cally reduced to the 'lacking other’ produced from the
perspective of the Center (in this case the Eurocentric or
Orientalist perspective). It is not the space of the Other
per se, constitutive of its own ideas, practices, activities
and relationships emanating from the structure of lan-
guage-logic-experience-ethos that cannot be reduced to
modernism-capitalism; where differences are indeed real
and are not mere lacking appendages to modernism-capi-
talism. We name this foreclosed Other, 'world of the
third’, world of the third as against the 'world of the
First’ and the 'world of the second’/’lacking First’, world
of the third as the constitutive outside of the dual struc-
ture of the 'world of the First’/’world of the lacking
First’1,4,5. Paradoxically, the language-logic-experience-
-ethos of world of the third is the materiality that is fun-
damentally displaced by the foregrounding of third
world-ism in conventional developmental literature.
'Tradition qua third world’ that is modernism’s 'alter
ego’ (or, pre-modern ala pre-capitalist in a historical
sense of past- ness) and 'Tradition qua world of the third’
that is non-modern (and largely non-capitalist with real
difference) comprise two contrasting and contending im-
aginaries. The first is what development includes and
works with, and the second is what it excludes. Putting it
in another way, the Other has two conceptual but related
existences, the third world as the constitutive inside of
development and world of the third as the constitutive
outside of development.
Every intervention in the name of a civilization
requires an initial contempt for the situation as a
whole, including its victims. And this is why the
reign of 'ethics’ coincides, after decades of coura-
geous critiques of colonialism and imperialism,
with today’s sordid self-satisfaction in the 'West’,
with the insistent argument according to which the
misery of the Third World is the result of its own in-
competence, its own inanity – in short, of its sub-
humanity (Badiou 2001: 13).
'Tradition’ in its derogatory third wordlist represen-
tation is this imagery of its, as if, self-inflicted sub-hu-
manity that in turn enables the hegemonic to intrude
into world of the third. Development thus cannot and
has never worked on the space of the Other by taking it
as it is; rather, it does so by giving a certain angularity to
world of the third in order to bring into existence the 'tra-
ditional’ or the 'third world-ist’. The discourse of mod-
ernization through development is therefore fundamen-
tally founded on this dyad of foregrounding and fore-
closure, what it includes (forming the constituted inside)
and excludes (forming the constitutive outside). This is
the philosophical foundation of development: exclusion
through inclusion. The inclusiveness of 'inclusive devel-
opment’ must be therefore seen as predicated on a cer-
tain third worldism that works through the exclusion of
the language-logic-experience-ethos of world of the third.
The New Map of the Indian Economy:
Circuits-Camp of Global Capital and
World of the Third
Following liberalization policies in India, spurred by
its wide industrial base (paradoxically, a gift of its previ-
ous import substitution policy) and fairly advanced
higher education system (also paradoxically courtesy its
erstwhile planning system), Indian industries, particu-
larly the big business houses, gradually adjusted to the
rules and demands of global competition and, along with
new enterprises, mutated into global capitalist enter-
prises. Through outsourcing and sub-contracting, they
forged relations with local enterprises procreating and
circumscribed within a nation’s border (the local market)
and with enterprises outside the nation’s border (the
global market). Specifically, via the local-global market,
global capital was linked to the ancillary local enterprises
(big and small scale, local capitalist and non-capitalist)
and other institutions (banking enterprise, trading en-
terprise, transport enterprise, etc.) and together they
formed the circuits of global capital. Induced by the ex-
pansion of the circuits of global capital (inclusive mainly
of manufacturing and services), rapid growth of the In-
dian economy is feeding an explosive process of urbaniza-
tion, and producing along the way a culture of individual-
ization and consumerism. It is being complemented by
new ideas of success, entrepreneurship and human capi-
tal, by ways of judging performance and conduct, by
changing labor-gender-caste related customs and mores,
etc. Resultantly, a social cluster of practices, activities
and relationships transpires that literally captures the
production of an encampment; we name it the 'camp of
global capital’. This camp, especially its hub, is becoming
the nursery ground of a new nationalist culture bent on
dismantling extant meanings of good life in India and re-
placing it with the 'tooth and claw’ model that empha-
sizes possession, competition and accumulation. We refer
to circuits-camp of global capital as global capitalism.I
Evidently, in this formation, global capital is taken as the
privileged center.
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World of the third, on the other hand, constitutes the
overdetermined space of capitalist and non-capitalist en-
terprises that procreate outside the circuits of global cap-
ital. It is a space that is conceptually never part of global
negotiations; it is outside the, if we may borrow a term
from Spivak, Empire-Nation exchange, where the latter
refers to exchanges within the local-global market con-
nected to the circuits of global capital. In short, world of
the third embrace an overdetermined cluster of social
processes procreating outside the circuits of global capi-
tal and are knotted to (local) markets as well as to
non-market exchanges. The social cluster of practices,
activities and relationships connected to the language-
-experience-logic-ethos of this space constitute the 'camp
of world of the third’. It may be recalled that what for us
is circuits-camp of world of the third is for modernist dis-
courses (like colonialism, development, and so on) third
world: this is the Orientalist moment through which the
modern emerges as the privileged center. Third world
supposedly epitomize mass poverty, arising in no small
part due to inefficient and non-competitive practices and
activities; third world as nurturing excess labor; as har-
boring a large reserve army of the unemployed/underem-
ployed. In short, it is re-presented as a figure of lack. One
does not get to appreciate the possibility of the truth of
outside to the circuits of global capital; through the fore-
closure of its language-experience-ethos-logic, one thus
loses sight of the world of the third. Instead, what awaits
us is a devalued space, a lacking underside – third world –
that needs to be transgressed-transformed-mutilated-as-
similated. In effect then, world of the third is brought
into the discursive register and worked upon, but with-
out taking cognizance of its language-logic-experience-
-ethos. Critically, this foreclosure of world of the third
through the foregrounding of third world (or, by substi-
tute signifiers such as social capital, community, etc.)
helps secure and facilitate the hegemony of (global) capital
and modernism over world of the third. Taken together, a
hegemonic formation materializes in which global capital
and modernism emerges as the privileged centers.
As it evolved gradually through an assortment of re-
forms, this paradigm shift produced a structural remap-
ping of the Indian economy, and split it into the 'cir-
cuits-camp of global capital’ qua global capitalism and its
outside 'world of the third’. This changing map of the In-
dian economy was driven by, among other things, the pri-
macy accorded to global capitalist performance, appro-
priation and distribution of surplus which, via high
growth rate, resulted in the expansion of the circuits-
-camp of global capitalism. This expansion, not surpris-
ingly, meant a war on, or what Marx called primitive ac-
cumulation of, world of the third. A rapid process of
expropriation of land, forest, rivers, etc., followed (espe-
cially in the last two decades), justified no doubt by the
idealized notion of 'progress’ of third world from its
so-called decrepitude state.II
This process had two moments – the current one is
that of dismantling extant societies and their forms of
lives and the future one (through trickle down) of ulti-
mately including these people into the circuits-camp of
global capital; if the first is about the pain/cost, then the
second is about gain/benefit. However, what appears as
progressive from a modernist perspective comes to be
seen as violence from the perspective of world of the
third, which in turn has produced country wide resis-
tance against what is seen as unjust intrusion and plun-
der; such has been the fierceness and widespread nature
of resistance that land acquisition, at least on a big scale,
has literally considerably slowed down. In the Indian
context today, we not only have a materially divided society
(income, socially), but also a nation with divided perspec-
tives and understanding of what is 'progress’ and 'just’.
The fierceness of the ensuing resistance can be attrib-
uted in part to the experiences of the sufferers of dis-
placement and dislocation following from the expansion
of the circuits-camp of global capital. The much vaunted
trickle down, 'future gain’ and job creation never ever ac-
tually arrived to these sections of the population formed
by mainly the most marginalized and under-privileged –
mainly, the Adivasis (indigenous population, designated
by the Indian state as Schedule Tribes) and Dalits (the
outcastes, designated as Schedule Caste).III In short,
growth has been exclusionary (that is, devoid of trickle
down effects), where the exclusion has taken two forms:
one, by disproportionately excluding a vast section of the
population from the benefits of rising income growthIV, a
phenomenon symbolized by worsening Gini coefficient,
and two, further exacerbating existing social inequities
(based on caste, ethnicity, gender, etc.). In fact, the dual
phenomena of income equality and social inequity com-
pensated, complemented and reinforced one another to
exclude a large section of the Indian population (residing
in the margins of the circuits-camp of global capital and
world of the third) from the benefits of economic growth;
while due to measurement problems there is some con-
troversy over the exact depth of income poverty reduc-
tionV, there is a strong indication that non-income fac-
tors of poverty (captured by the statistics of malntrition,
health, education, etc.) continue to show extraordinary
resiliance.VI The overall picture is that of a country of in-
creased prosperity (concentrated in the hub of the cir-
cuits-camp of global capital) accompanied by growing di-
vide and social dysfunction as well. It is in this domain
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that we enter now to understand the political economy of
inclusive development.
The Political Economy of Inclusive
Development
Following India’s tryst with liberalization, especially
during the first decade and a half of the so-called reform
period, the dominant belief argued that hiking up the av-
erage growth rate level (from its previous Hindu rate) is
the key to solving India’s development question, espe-
cially of mass poverty. It was accepted that placing In-
dian economy within neoliberal globalization and global
capitalism would achieve the necessary structural break
required to meet that objective. This self-belief reached
its zenith at the time of the BJP led National Democratic
Alliance government which, embroiled by the confidence
in India’s increasing growth rate level, fought the 2004
elections with the slogan of 'Shining India,’ to only
shockingly lose to the Congress led United Progressive
Alliance. For the political class and policy makers, this
result was a signal drawing attention to the new division
of so-called 'India’ (the gainers) and 'Bharat’ (the losers)
that had emerged as a result of India’s materializing eco-
nomic map in the era of globalization. It laid the seeds of
the idea of inclusive development in India.
In the first few years of this decade, there was a
feeling that 'India was shining’. It was, however, re-
alized that the 'feel good factor’ was only in some
indicators… There was an increasing feeling that
only few sections of the population such as rich and
middle class particularly in the urban areas, corpo-
rate sector, foreign institutional investors, IT sec-
tor have benefited from the economic reforms… On
the other hand, rural India and social sector have
not been shining. Social exclusion is taking place in
terms of regions, social and marginal groups, wo-
men, minorities and children. (Dev 2007, 14)8
The birth of inclusive development accordingly stems
from an awareness that the trickle down thesis by way of
creating and expanding the circuits-camp of global capi-
tal through a competitive market economy is not work-
ing sufficiently well and quickly enough. That is, the
growth induced pull up strategy of poverty reduction as
part of a self-propelling logic of competitive market econ-
omy was seen as faltering.
A nation interested in inclusive growth views
the same growth differently depending upon on
whether the gains of the growth are heaped primar-
ily on a small segment or shared widely by the pop-
ulation. The latter is a cause for celebration but not
the former. In other words, growth must not be
treated as an end in itself but as an instrument for
spreading prosperity to all. India’s own past experi-
ence and the experience of other nations suggests
that growth is necessary for eradicating poverty
but it is not a sufficient condition. In other words,
policies for promoting growth need to be comple-
mented with policies to ensure that more and more
people join in the growth process and, further, that
there are mechanisms in place to redistribute some
of the gains to those who are unable to partake in
the market process and, hence, get left behind.
(Economic Survey 2010, 22)9
But, what caused the seemingly straightforward rela-
tion between growth and poverty reduction to go wrong?
As both the quotes suggest, if one throws in the element
of increased income inequality, the oft mentioned straight-
forward relation between growth and poverty could turn
ambiguous10,11; particularly, with high income inequality,
high growth may not be matched with fast poverty re-
duction as is often claimed; there may be poverty traps
induced by income and endowment inequality12.
It is argued that both income inequality and social ex-
clusion have deepened as a result of India’s tryst with
neoliberalism, globalization and global capitalism. In-
come inequality and social exclusion could be particu-
larly seen as deadly cocktail because income inequality
intersects, complements, and reinforces social inequity
highlighted by the exclusion of socially disadvantageous
groups such as Adivasis, Dalits, Muslims, children, wo-
men and so on (overwhelmingly residing at the margins
of circuits of global capital and particularly world of the
third and forming the bulk of India’s poor) from the ben-
efits of economic growth. The problem of economic growth
in India is not merely that of a growing income divide,
but where it, instead of reducing social inequities, is wid-
ening them.
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At least four alternative figures are available: 29 percent from the Planning Commission, 50 percent from the N.C. Saxena Committee report, 37 percent from
the Tendulkar Committee report, and 77 percent from the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS). The Tendulkar Com-
mittee report and the Planning Commission estimate point to a sharp reduction in poverty, which is challenged by others.
(VI) The scenario of social deprivation mirrors that of income poverty, so far as the Adivasis and Dalits are concerned. For example, as of 2005/06, infant
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children) and malnutrition among woman ((BMI<18.5) (accounting for one third of India’s woman); for all these cases the scenario is worst for Adivasis
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It is important to highlight at this point the dual na-
ture of the problem, an aspect not quite appreciated in
the existing literature. It pertains to an underlying dis-
tinction between the problem of income inequality with
reference to growth and the problem of inequity with ref-
erence to 'third world’ cultures. Let us first discuss in-
come inequality in the context of growth which mainly
springs from global capitalism that is guided by neolibe-
ral philosophy.
At one level, income inequality from market driven
outcomes that typically transpire within the circuits-
-camp of global capital is not, as we understand, a matter
of great concern for the Indian policy makers; the market
distributed outcome within the competitive market econ-
omy is taken as sacrosanct. However, it is also simulta-
neously acknowledged that the benefits of growth are not
percolating beyond the border of the circuits-camp of
global capital or even to its margins, to the extent desir-
able. Concentrated essentially in the hub of the cir-
cuits-camp of global capital, growth is thus acknowl-
edged as exclusionary; exclusionary, not in the sense that
it expropriates the world of the third via primitive accu-
mulationVII as we have argued (which in this modernist
frame is considered inevitable for the expansion of cir-
cuits-camp of global capital), but because it fails to de-
liver on grounds of income distribution. But then this is
hardly surprising since market related outcome pertains
to (in)efficiency issues (that includes distributive effi-
ciency) and not question of (in)justice ala gross (in)eq-
uity; the latter has to be analyzed in a different plane re-
quiring a different set of tools. How do we reconcile the
two positions? We will come back to this matter soon.
Meanwhile, what about the other case of social ineq-
uities epitomizing the backward structure of third world
institutions within which the mechanics of competitive
market economy is not implanted satisfactorily. Isn’t it
the case that the structurally imposed social inequities
(say, caste based) in turn make possible various kinds of
social exclusion? Moreover, doesn’t social inequities –
producing further differences in types of opportunities
such as education and health, nature of work, access to
elementary functionings enjoyed by others, etc. – relate
to income inequality? Is income inequality derived from
extant structures of social exclusion the same as income
inequality derived from the failure of trickle down from
growth? What then is relevant to the idea of inclusive de-
velopment in the Indian context?
Let us begin by looking at the treatment of social ex-
clusion as perceived in 'third world' contexts. Third world
is not just represented as poor but also as highly socially
unequal, which is a result of 'bad' institutions, low hu-
man capital investment, and underdevelopment. Discus-
sing the states of Adivasis and Dalits in India, the World
Bank is explicit about the relation between poverty and
the trap of structurally imposed social inequities epito-
mizing social exclusion:
Social exclusion...has its roots in historical divi-
sions along lines of caste, tribe, and the excluded
sex, that is, women. These inequalities are more
structural in nature and have kept entire groups
trapped, unable to take advantage of opportunities
that economic growth offers. Culturally rooted sys-
tems perpetuate inequality, and, rather than a cul-
ture of poverty that afflicts disadvantaged groups,
it is, in fact, these traps that prevent these groups
from breaking out. (The World Bank 2011c: 2)9
Not surprisingly, the World Bank positions its eco-
nomic programs as key instruments in transforming the
so-called third world cultures and institutions so that the
traps of social exclusion can be broken; it is this non-eco-
nomic trap rooted in its 'backward’ culture which is held
primarily responsible for poverty by denying certain
groups the opportunities which others enjoy. Structu-
rally imposed social inequities create endogenously de-
rived social exclusions that perpetuate poverty. It is
through the creation and expansion of market and the
tropes of competition, profit, individuality, property rights,
etc., that, the World Bank type development program be-
lieves, would help the 'third world’ bypass the cultural
traps which are holding them back; this conclusion is
somewhat akin to that forwarded13 which global capital-
ism is visualized as functioning through the competitive
market economy as an engine of social transformation
that will flatten the structurally imposed social divides in
India. Notwithstanding the problem of economism inher-
ent in these readings and the inability to fathom the
quite insidious articulation of global capitalism with ex-
tant social divisions, from our vantage point, they quite
forcefully envisage as 'progressive’ the simultaneous ex-
pansion of the circuits-camp of global capital and the ac-
companying dismantling/transformation of world of the
third societies through modernization/development.
The 'progressive’ nature of this logic is complemented
by the fact that in attacking and slaying the age old
scourge of social exclusion, the expansion of the cir-
cuits-camp of global capital through the conduit of com-
petitive market economy is seen to solve the central
problem of structural poverty; growth induced by pene-
tration of market and its culture would not only help
transform the extant institutions there, but draw people
into the ambit of competitive market economy and hence
would be liberating. In other words, the benefits of
growth would spread through the conduit of market and
reduce poverty. In short, modernization is good for the
oppressed and the poor. There is no reason to believe that
the Indian government has ever thought otherwise in its
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(VII) It is also now a commonplace knowledge that displacement due to the expansion of circuits-camp of global capital is heavily skewed against the
Adivasis and Dalits; most of the development-induced dislocation has come from these groups, particularly the Adivasis. India’s high growth rate that
propelled the excavation of minerals and natural bounties became a curse for Adivasis who have been residing in those areas for centuries. Unlike what
the World Bank would want us to believe, here it is not ‘traditional’ cultural structures but rather the inexorable process of modernization that has been










post-independent development journey; previously it
perceived state as the pioneer of this transformation of
the so-called third world and now it sees that possible
through the competitive market economy.
However, in the above explanation, the burden of the
problem and the focus is exclusively on world of the
third, albeit working through the trope of third world-
ism. What if the problem is to be located at the center
and is not that of the margins or even its outside. Spe-
cifically, what happens if, as the Economic SurveyVIII
claims, the benefits of growth spread unequally and does
so in a manner where a certain group such as those in the
hub of global capital garners a bulk of the increase in in-
come? What happens if markets distribute growing
wealth in a vastly unequal manner, a point we discussed
earlier? The strength of this claim lies in strong evidence
that the lowest quintile of the population has received al-
most no benefits of growth; Economic Survey of India
(henceforth ES) highlights while, from 1977–78 to 2004–
05, the average income of the poorest quintile of Indian
population showed marginal increase in comparison to
its own income, it got less than 0.2 of the aggregate in-
crease in income7.IX In other words, the problem here is
not that of centuries’ old extant culture/institutions, but
must be traced to the aspect of the failure of the competi-
tive market economy to align high income growth with
reasonably fair income distribution that would deliver
benefits to the left-out population. Addressing structural
inequities and persistent poverty by the process of dis-
mantling and transforming the backward structures of
world of the third is one thing while attending to income
inequality from the failure of trickle down of growth is
quite another; the latter problem acquires a more acute
concern in case of Indian when that income divide
merges with and reinforces the already existing social di-
vides, a complex scenario one cannot fathom in a World
Bank-Nilekani type description of the Indian economy. In
this context, one must remember that certain groups like
Adivasis and Dalits are on the receiving end of both in-
come inequality and social inequities. Evidently, this
schism, that is growing and leading to problems of desti-
tution, alienation, insurgencyX and sustainability, is a
problem of modernization process as well.
This realization that economic growth is perhaps only
serving and enriching the hub of the circuits-camp of
global capital leaving behind the rest of India forced a re-
thinking towards inclusive development. In this context,
the policy makers are veering towards the conclusion
that, alongside structural transformation, redistribution
of income from the growth derived from the expansion of
the circuits-camp of global capital too is required for pov-
erty reduction. Somehow, the seemingly contradictory
dual aspects of market based outcome based on efficiency
criteria and the socially just outcome derived from equity
principle must be reconciled.
Acknowledging that two economies/societies – India
(the rich and included epitomizing 'modern’) and Bharat
(the poor and excluded epitomizing 'traditional’) – have
emerged out of neo-liberal forms of globalization and its
associated reform process, this shift embodied in the
Common Minimum Program of successive UPA govern-
ments signifies a directional shift from that of growth
centered around the hub of circuits-camp of global capi-
tal towards one of growth with inclusion of world of the
third through poverty management and transformative
construction; the latter of course entails a self-projected
rationale of treating world of the third as weak and fledg-
ing, in a word as third world, or as Bharat.
Does this acknowledgment entail an abandonment or
de-emphasis of neo-liberalism and global capitalism? Far
from it. Economic growth driven by competitive market
economy is considered necessary because the bigger the
pie the greater will be the scope for an expansive redistri-
butive program, that is, for inclusion to be realized. In
fact, the former is a condition for the latter to succeed.
But then, with the political rationale of neo-liberalism in-
tact that guarantees the need to secure and facilitate the
expansion of circuits-camp of global capital, how is this
divide to be dealt with?
This question gathers importance in light of our anal-
ysis that even market based outcomes may not be suffi-
cient enough to liberate the poor from their current pre-
dicaments; this point submits to the limit of the
modernist virtues of growth or of structural transforma-
tion of third world per se. While these are considered im-
portant in alleviating the problems of poverty they may
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(VIII) Economic Survey of India is a Ministry of Finance document that is considered a mouth piece of Indian state’s overall policy orientation.
(IX) One can also somewhat grossly gauge this schism of growing prosperity and rising social inequities by looking at India’s rank by human development
index (HDI). While India’s value of HDI (0.547) has been increasing in the last two decades, it is still ranked 134 out of 187 countries which is lower than
its per capita GDP (PPP US $) rank and also below even the region of South Asia14,15; in terms of gender development index (valued at 0.645), its rank is
129 out of 187 countries. Indeed, figures of adverse sex ratio (the female-male ration being 0.93 in 2001), literacy and child mortality, while improving
across time series, indicates still severe problems in perception, education and health sector. For instance, according to UNICEF (2012)16, India had the
highest number of deaths of children under-five-years of age.
(X) According to India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, the armed insurgency by the Maoists is the biggest internal security threat currently faced by
India; this insurgency, known as the Naxalite movement and led by the Communist Party of India (Maoist) has now spread to 125 districts across 12
states. Its main support comes from the Adivasis and Dalits (Expert Committee Report, Government of India 2008)6. In a remarkably candid admission
recently, the Minister of Rural Development, Jairam Ramesh, noted about the Adivasis: »We have taken these tribal areas for granted, we see these areas
only as mineral-rich areas, we see them from the view of coal, uranium, iron ore, bauxite. We don’t see them from the point of view of the tribals. We have
80 million tribals, not 10–20 lakh (1–2 million) of tribals…There was a great sensitivity we showed (earlier) to the tribal areas (he is referring to re-liber-
alizing period in this line: emphasis ours). Unfortunately, in this mad rush for economic growth, we seem to have put tribal interests secondary and put
the interests of miners and the mineral wealth in front. That is not the way it should be and we are paying the price for that.« (excerpts, interview with
Jairam Ramesh, 2012)16. He is, of course, referring to the deleterious effect of primitive accumulation emanating from the expansion of the circuits-camp










not be sufficient for reducing income inequality; rather
they may exacerbate the problem of social inequities and
through that impede the speed of poverty reduction.
The truth…is that, while markets have a natu-
ral propensity to deliver on efficiency, they do not
have any innate propensity for equity or equality.
Hence it is true that for eradicating poverty and
creating a more equitable and inclusive society,
there is need for purposive action by Government –
Central, State, and local. The view we take is that
Government should play an enabling role vis-a-vis
the market, facilitating trade, exchange, and enter-
prise. On the other hand, when it comes to distribu-
tion and the mitigation of poverty, Government has
to be more proactive with policy interventions.18
The acknowledged problem is thus one of disconnect
between growth and poverty reduction, and markets can-
not be relied upon to solve a problem of this magnitude.
The only institution that can possibly take care of a prob-
lem of this magnitude is the state. Hence the rationale of
the existence of state as a distributive agency as sharply
distinct from (i) (local-global) market within circuits-
-camp of global capital and (ii) from markets that are be-
ing implanted in world of the third as part of institu-
tional interventions aimed at subverting and supplan-
ting the extant backward structures (the World Bank
recipe). In its distributive role, the state may of course
take recourse to market as is being reported under seri-
ous consideration (say, by substituting in kind public dis-
tribution of food with cash which can be used to purchase
necessary goods from the market), but here market is not
the chief conduit of income distribution; rather, the state
is the chief conduit which through its control of market
for this purpose – by way of controlling who can buy (the
ones who get the cash/voucher are targeted population)
and to what extent (the amount of cash/voucher per per-
son is also fixed) – renders its income re-distribution fea-
sible.
At this point, it is important to differentiate between
inclusive growth and inclusive development; the former
is a subset of the latter. Inclusive development pertains
to the combined existence of social inequity and income
inequality; acknowledging a relation between the two, it
strives to seek a broad model of inclusion that would end
the scourge of social exclusion and income exclusion in
one turn. Thus, poverty reduction must be linked to the
uplifting of Adivasis, Dalits and other marginalized
groups; in accordance, development programs of poverty
must target, as it does in India, social groups. In con-
trast, inclusive growth is more focused and pertains to
the relation between growth, income inequality and pov-
erty in terms of what accrues to the bottom quintile of
the poor as a result of growth; it acknowledges the need
to address the poorest of the poor through the medium of
the state.
A simple way of giving this idea of inclusive
growth a sharper form is to measure a nation’s
progress in terms of the progress of its poorest seg-
ment, for instance the bottom 20 percent of the
population. One could measure the per capita in-
come of the bottom quintile of the population and
also calculate the growth rate of its income; and
evaluate our economic success in terms of these
measures that pertain to the poorest segment. This
approach is attractive because it does not ignore
growth like some of the older heterodox criteria
did. It simply looks at the growth of income of the
poorest sections of the population. It also ensures
that those who are outside of the bottom quintile
do not get ignored. If that were done, then those
people would in all likelihood drop down into the
bottom quintile and so would automatically become
a direct target of our policies. Hence the criterion
being suggested here is a statistical summing up of
the idea of inclusive growth. The policy discussions
that follow do not explicitly refer to this but are in-
spired by this idea of inclusive growth, which, in
turn, leads to two corollaries, to wit that India must
strive to achieve high growth and that we must
work to ensure that the weakest segments benefit
from the growth.9
While not exactly the same, inclusive growth is con-
sidered an indirect instrument of social inclusion, since
most of the poor supposedly belong to the above men-
tioned categories of the 'socially excluded’; inclusive growth
can thus be seen as an important component of ending
social exclusion. Programs such as MNREGA (that guar-
antees 100 days employment in rural areas to below pov-
erty line people) and the impending food security bill (es-
sentially targeting the below poverty line population) are
examples of inclusive growth and social exclusion.
The few sample quotes of Economic Survey reflecting
the policy direction of Indian state points to both the rec-
ognition of two territorially distinct societies as also to a
bifurcation of the rationales of the state itself to address
the dual nature of societies. Consequently, it is now con-
jectured that neo-liberalism propelling the creation of a
competitive market economy will drive the circuits-camp
of global capital while a different dose of policies, based
on redistribution of a portion of economic growth, will be
directed at world of the third economies, at times
through programs targeting socially excluded populace
and at other times targeting the income excluded popula-
tion; policies of inclusive development will thus be con-
ducted directly by the state. Courtesy inclusive develop-
ment, growth and equality/equity are attempted to be
re-positioned as complementary to one another; rather
than trying to redistribute from elements that could af-
fect growth (say, through increase in corporate tax) by
distorting the market based outcomes, the emphasis is
more on redistribution from received income that results
from competitive market economy as also focusing on in-
crease in tax base rather than tax rate (consider here the
expanding base of service tax); the objective is to least
impair its functioning and prevent distortions that might
reduce growth. Another instance of this sifting stance is
the use of proceeds from disinvestment of state enter-











prises for propelling the social programs as already dis-
cussed by us. High economic growth, proceeds from eq-
uity value of corporatized state enterprises and robust
stock market (so that IPOs can be launched) symbolizing
the vibrancy of circuits-camp of global capital are consid-
ered crucial for the success of inclusive development tar-
geting the world of the third.
The state accordingly is now to be seen as combining
two rationales, one implying its somewhat passive exis-
tence with respect to competitive market economy (ex-
cept when crisis irrupts from within the competitive
market economy) and the other all throughout interven-
tionist; it is to be simultaneously neo-liberal and diri-
giste, now working in a coherent but divided manner.
We need a Government that, when it comes to
the market, sets effective, incentive-compatible
rules and remains on the sidelines with minimal in-
terference, and at the same time, plays an impor-
tant role in directly helping the poor by ensuring
that they get basic education and health services
and receive adequate nutrition and food. This roll-
back of the Government in the former will enable it
to devote more energy and resources to and be
more effective in the latter. This roll back of the
government in the former will enable it to devote
more energy and resources to and be more effective
in the latter.9
It becomes evident then that the problem of the dis-
tribution of the income benefits of growth to the hitherto
excluded populace which formed the crux of the idea of
inclusive development laid down the foundation of a new
theory of the Indian state. This is important since this
new rationalization of the state went against the ratio-
nale for the rollback of the state in the context of neo-
liberal philosophy that has acquired global domination.
We now end the discussion with two associated issues
Inclusive Development and Primitive
Accumulation: Benevolent and Violent
Face of India’s Modernization
It needs no great imagination to see that inclusive de-
velopment focuses on the compassionate face of the state,
pertaining to what is benevolent about it, how it engages
in the act of handholding with respect to world of the
third, albeit in the name of rescuing third world from its
so-called decrepitude state. However, inclusive develop-
ment is only one node of the triad. The logic of almost un-
regulated creation and expansion of the circuits-camp of
global capital produced in turn an encroachment, at
times wholesale dismantling of and at other times severe
disruption in world of the third. The separation of the
masses, connected to world of the third, from means of
production and subsistence is primitive accumulation
that has also been in full swing in India, encouraged no
doubt by the growth-obsessed policies of the state. While
this is no place to discuss primitive accumulation in de-
tail, it suffices to note here that the state’s relation with
world of the third has been two-fold, and almost contra-
dictory; armed with inclusive development it is benevo-
lent; it is violent when facilitating primitive accumula-
tion of capital.
In the context of the present discussion, of particular
relevance is the intersection of the two dimensions which
virtually remain as the unsaid of the official discourse of
inclusive development; by intersection we mean the con-
fluence of inclusive development programs that take the
space of world of the third as it is (of course, seen
through the lens of third world) and the irruptions lo-
cated at the shifting border between the expanding cir-
cuits of global capital and world of the third that materi-
alizes via the process of primitive accumulation. It is this
in-between location giving way to the expansion of the
circuits-camp of global capital via the dislocation of world
of the third that signals the unmasking of the benevolent
face underlying the rationale of inclusive development
and the Indian state. Beneath that aura of passivity and
do-goodism inherent in the official definition of inclusive
development exists the violent, brutal and cunning side
of a developmental state that in one turn intervenes in
world of the third via various inclusion programs even as
it comes down hard on world of the third to secure and
facilitate the process of primitive accumulation and any
consequent fall outs. Situating itself between war and
peace, the destructive rationale of primitive accumula-
tion operationalized through the expansion of the cir-
cuits-camp of global capital and the somewhat benevo-
lent rationale of victimhood inherent in inclusive
development merges to bring the state to side with the
expanding circuits-camp of global capital at the expense
of world of the third. The constitutive outside of inclu-
sive development at this moment merges with the consti-
tutive outside of the circuits-camp of global capital as
well; and the secret alliance between state and global
capital becomes particularly palpable. Moreover, we have
also seen that it is principally the Adivasis and Dalits
constituting the poorest of the poor who bears the brunt
of the assault on world of the third. Not surprisingly,
these groups (alongside farmers) are in the forefront of
both non-violent resistance organized by social move-
ments against this process of primitive accumulation
conducted by the state-capital nexus as also forming the
main support base for the more violent resistance shaped
by the Maoists.
Is Inclusive Development Feasible?
Success of inclusive development must come to terms
with a knife edge problem. That problem is a financial
one. It pertains to the fact that redistribution for inclu-
sion based programs demands a certain flow of funds;
that flow of funds would essentially come from economic
growth transpiring in the circuits-camp of global capital.
In other words, there must be a match across time be-
tween funds from economic growth and funds needed for
distribution to satisfy projects of inclusion, social and in-
come based. This could be obtained in two ways. First, by











keeping the economic growth high and high enough to
sustain the financial flow needed for distribution; in that
case, without greatly disturbing the income ascendancy
of circuits-camp of global capital, resources can be trans-
ferred to fund inclusion. Here, the presumption about
tax regime is such that it will only marginally affect
growth; tax is somewhat growth neutral for which the
emphasis is not on increasing the marginal tax rate but
on expanding the tax base. This, of course, is what we de-
scribed as the policy maker’s way. Second, if economic
growth falters, as is the current scenario after the global
economic crisis hit India, then the only alternative left is
to tax-squeeze the circuits-camp of global capital so much
that economic growth could be further effected; here, tax
regimes may have negative repercussions for growth. If
that happens, then the distortionary effects of inclusive
development will combine with that of global economic
crisis to bring the growth rate further down. The prob-
lem is that the relation between growth and inclusion is
not supposed to transpire in a static but dynamic plane
making it an inter-generational problem.
Already, this trope of inclusive development is under
severe stress following the after effects of the global eco-
nomic crisis and internal pressures by various constitu-
ents (both from within the camp of global capital and
world of the third) that many claim, by stalling reforms
and the process of land acquisition, are internally de-
rived growth impediments. This is bringing down the
rate of growth, particularly affecting the hub of the cir-
cuits of global capital (the primary value creating sector)
that encompasses industry (manufacturing and servi-
ces). This is putting severe pressure on the margins of
the circuits of global capital because, as they are con-
nected by the chain of local-global markets, any weak-
ness in the hub puts the margins under severe stress, in-
cluding that of livelihood; one would expect many
previously in the circuits-camp of global capital to be
thrown into the world of the third. On the other hand,
the high fiscal deficit (in part due to managing inclusive
development now exacerbated by the lower rate of
growth) along with the pressure to reduce fiscal deficit
through subsidy reduction to segments in the margins of
circuits of global capital and world of the third (in large
part due to the dominance of neoliberalism within and
beyond policy making circles; that includes the increas-
ing grip of financial market over the real sector and
hence policy) is indicative of the knife edge problem we
have been referring to. This is a problem and stress that
is new in the Indian context as it arises in the context of
the triad of neoliberal globalization, global capitalism
and inclusive development that has already shifted the
nature and contour of India’s economic map.
Conclusion
India’s so-called miracle story is not without schisms
and contestations; as also attempts to engage with them.
Using the dialectical dyad of third world and world of the
third as two covalent but contesting explications of tradi-
tion, the political economy of inclusive development was
unpacked to highlight a process of modernization
through assimilation of world of the third. The process of
assimilation though is counteracted by a concomitant
process of annihilation of world of the third, a process of
primitive accumulation that is operationalized through
the physical expansion of the circuits-camp of global cap-
ital. It is through this seemingly contradictory process of
assimilation and annihilation that India’s transition
story falteringly evolves. However, in the present, both
these requirements are faced with grave challenges, the
project of assimilation from a faltering growth curve and
that of annihilation from the mass resistance and peo-
ple’s movements in world of the third. Faced with this
twin phenomenon and the challenges they present, the
rationale of Indian state is accordingly altering and mu-
tating.
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ISPITIVANJE UKLJU^ENOG RAZVOJA U INDIJSKOM TRANZICIJSKOM PROCESU
S A @ E T A K
Ovaj rad ima dva srodna doprinosa. Kao prvo, dvojnost ekonomske strukture koja le`i u podlozi razvoja stvara
distinktivnu koncepciju obezvrje|enog tre}eg svijeta, koji je u prednjem planu i svijeta tre}ega, koji je isklju~en i u
pozadini. Ova dijada uklju~enosti-isklju~enosti drugoga stvorena je u kontekstu centara kapitalizma i modernizma.
Kategorija tre}eg svijeta poma`e da se jezi~no-empirijsko-logi~ki etos svijeta tre}ega istisne te tako razvoj funkcionira
na na~in da se svijet tre}eg mijenja i transformira putem obezvrje|enog tre}eg svijeta. Mi koristimo navedeni okvir
kako bismo istra`ili dvojaki odnos globalnog kapitalizma i svijeta tre}ega u kontekstu Indije. S jedne strane postoji
nastojanje da se svijet tre}ega razru{i, kao dio razvoja koji zna~i prevladavanje tre}eg svijeta. S druge strane, uklju-
~enim razvojem se poku{ava izravno utjecati na ekonomiju svijeta tre}ega, kako bi se naglasili problemi nejednakosti
prihoda i dru{tvene isklju~enosti.
A. Chakrabarti and A. Dhar: Inclusive Development in India’s Transition, Coll. Antropol. 36 (2012) 4: 1089–1099
1099
	
	


	
!
"

!#
